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ABSTRACT
Multimedia systems mostly base security on a restricted access
to services. In the context of real-time imaging applications, this
model suffers several drawbacks. Applications become vulnera-
ble to password attacks and once exposed attackers have access
to all the data. An alternative consists of the systematic encryp-
tion of all data. When dealing with images, this approach is in-
convenient because the data needs to be processed in its entirety
before users can gain any insight. As well, the decryption task
requires large amounts of processing power. This presentation
shows how partial encryption can match applications require-
ments without the overhead of full encryption.
The paper first analyzes several schemes mixing encryption and
image encoding. Then we focus on a technique that imple-
ments partial encryption of images based on JPEG. The tech-
nique is built to meet two major requirements: (1) preserve the
overall bitrate, and (2) remain compliant with the JPEG file for-
mat. Finally we introduce and elaborate on a new scheme that
combines flexibility, multiple encryption, spatial selectivity, self
sufficiency, and format compliance. We show how it could fit
the needs of real-time applications.
1. INTRODUCTION
Hiding the content of a message when it enters an inse-
cure channel should be common practice. Unfortunately
none of the audio-visual compression standards includes
any mechanism to convert part of the bitstream into ci-
phertext prior to transmission.
The encryption process requires an encryption algo-
rithm and a key. The process of recovering plaintext
from ciphertext is called decryption. The accepted view
amongst cryptographers is that the encryption algorithm
should be published, whereas the key must be kept se-
cret (KERKHOFF’s law). In practice, the distribution of
keys is difficult since keys should be exchanged only when
a trusted channel has been established. Furthermore for
real-time video systems there are other issues to be ad-
dressed: speed, compression efficiency, and flexibility.
Speed depends on the encryption algorithm, and on the
type of information that is processed. In real-time video
transmission, there are basically two strategies depending
on wether or not compression takes place before encryp-
tion, since we may assume that compression and encryp-
tion are both unavoidable. Compression applied first re-
duces the bitstream but it offers less secrecy. On the other
hand if encryption is applied first, compression is ineffec-
tive.
Fortunately there exists an alternative called selective en-
cryption that works as depicted in Figure 1 and is the main




















Figure 1: Selective encryption mechanism [1].
parts of the bitstream are encrypted.
An interesting additional feature for real time applications
is the ability to use any decoder, even if parts of the bit-
stream have been encrypted. If bitstream compatibility
is targeted, the bitstream should only be altered at places
where it does not compromise the compliance to the orig-
inal format.
Many algorithms for selective encryption have been pro-
posed but they usually require a proprietary decoder which
is unsuitable in the field of video transmission where ISO
standards dominates the market.
2. SELECTIVE ENCRYPTION OF COMPRESSED
IMAGES
2.1. Short review
In the middle of the 90s there have been several papers on
the selective encryption of MPEG streams. MAPLES et
al. [2] proposed an algorithm which encrypts only the In-
tra (I) frames of an MPEG stream. However AGI et al. [3]
reported that the selective encryption of the I frames only
offers a limited level of security, due mainly to the pres-
ence of blocks coded in intra mode in P or B frames, but
also to the high correlation of P and B frames when they
correspond to the same I frame. This scheme is subject
to cryptanalysis, a common problem when compression
occurs prior to encryption.
Alternative encryption techniques were developed by
other authors. In particular, several techniques have been
proposed for the encryption of DCT based coded image.
A method called zig-zag permutation was originated by
TANG [4]. Although this scheme offers more security, it
increases the overall bit rate.
Another algorithm, developed by QIAO and NAHRSTEDT,
is based on the frequency distribution of pairs of two ad-
jacent bytes in an MPEG bitstream [5]. As proven by the
authors, this algorithm provides overall security, and size
preservation, but does not meet the requirements of visual
acceptance and bitstream compliance.
Other methods have been proposed recently (see [6] for a
recent view) but they fail to achieve all of the following
requirements:
[visual acceptance] part of information may be visible
but the encrypted image should look noisy,
[selective encryption] encryption occurs after compres-
sion and leaves parts of the bitstream unencrypted,
[constant bit rate] encryption should preserve the size of
the bitstream, and
[bitstream compliance] the encryption step should pro-
duce a compliant bitstream according to the chosen
format definition.
Researchers have shown that selective encryption is not
restricted to MPEG encoded images. For example POM-
MER et al. [7] and NORCEN et al. [8] have proposed tech-
niques for the selective encryption of wavelet packet sub-
band structures and JPEG 2000 respectively.
2.2. A method for the selective encryption of JPEG
images
Because of its widespread use, MPEG was the primary
focus for selective encryption. But since MPEG-2 was
developed with video broadcasting in mind, selective en-
cryption of MPEG streams will rely on an efficient mech-
anism for key distribution. An additional difficulty results
from the high correlation between frames. MPEG-2 re-
moves many redundancies contained in a video stream
but an encoder leaves a residual correlation that affects
secrecy and eases cryptanalysis.
Therefore we concentrate on the JPEG standard which is
more likely to be used in point to point transmission.
The method described hereafter was first proposed in [1].
We will discuss extensions in Section 3.
2.2.1. Short description of a compliant selective encryp-
tion of JPEG images
In JPEG, the HUFFMAN coder aggregates zero coeffi-
cients into runs of zeros. In order to approach the en-
tropy, it also uses symbols that combine the run of zeros
with magnitude categories for the non-zero coefficients
that terminate the runs. 8-bit code words are assigned by
the HUFFMAN coder to these symbols. These code words
are followed by appended bits that fully specify the sign
and magnitude of the non-zero coefficients. We decided
to leave the code words but to encrypt the appended bits.
The reasons are that code words are essential for synchro-
nization and that it does not make much sense to replace
zero coefficients by non-zero coefficients. Therefore it is
essential to preserve the run values. Also, it is not effective
to encrypt DC coefficients because they carry important
visible information and are highly predictable. Our algo-
rithm encrypts appended bits corresponding to a selected
number of AC coefficients. This set of coefficients is the
same for each DCT block.
3. EXTENSIONS TO SELECTIVE ENCRYPTION
3.1. Multiple selective encryption
If there is a single copyright owner, called owner here-
after, he will apply the selective DCT encryption algo-
rithm to a subset C1 of coefficients of the JPEG image
f with a key k1. The resulting image is g = Ek1(f).
At the receiver side the decryption algorithm D is able
to recompute f if and only if k1 is known: f =
Dk1(Ek1(f)). Alternatively we could have used an en-
cryption technique based on a public key and a private
key since our technique can accommodate any encryption
process.
If there is a second owner, he should be able to choose a
subset C2 of DCT coefficients and to encrypt them with
his own key k2 as well. The image sent over the network
is then h = Ek2(Ek1(f)). We named this principle “mul-
tiple selective encryption” when C1and C2 are chosen in-
dependently.
3.2. Over-encryption
When C1 intersects with C2 (C1 ∩ C2 6= ∅), coefficients
encrypted twice are more sensitive to attacks and it is
recommended to use a technique called over-encryption,
that corresponds to Ek1(Dk2(Ek1(f))), as proposed by
TUCHMAN [9]. According to SCHNEIER [10], over-
encryption offers better performances than Ek2(Ek1(f)).
3.3. Generalized selective encryption scheme
In a generalized scheme we may want to provide:
1. Flexibility.
A user should be able to tune the level of encryption,
i.e. the subset of DCT coefficients.
2. Multiplicity.
Suppose C1 and C2 are informations that owners 1
and 2 will encrypt. (C1 ∪ C2)\(C1 ∩ C2) are en-
crypted independently but C1 ∩ C2 is preferrably
over-encrypted. Figure 2 shows an image encrypted
by owner 1 (b), and the same image further encrypted
by owner 2 (c). Note that:
(a) if C1 ∩ C2 = ∅, multiplicity is nothing but a
parallelization.
(b) there is no need for C1 and C2 to be fixed
through the whole encryption process. These
coefficient sets could change randomly over
time to enhance secrecy.
3. Spatial selectivity.
It is often not required to encrypt the whole image.
For example in “head and shoulder” sequences, it
might be sufficient to encrypt the “head”. Encrypted
image zones are marked in a binary map, called se-
lection map, and there is one bit per 8× 8 block.
By default a selection map is uniform, but when sev-
eral owners implement spatial selectivity there are as
many selection maps as owners. Figure 2(d) illus-
trates spatial selectivity.
4. Self sufficiency and compliance.
C1, C2 and selection maps are additional informa-
tions a decoder needs to decrypt the image. It is pos-
sible to embed them into an image as described by
FRIDRICH [11] although at the expense of a bitrate
increase.
The scheme drawn in Figure 3 implements all these prop-
erties.
Data is split into several slices. Some slices are left
unmodified (this is referred to as part (1) on Figure 3)
while other slices (2) are processed by encryption blocks
ordered into a sequence S. Slices are encrypted by known
algorithms (RSA, Rijndael, etc) with different keys. Note
that all encryption blocks may be different. However if a
slice is encrypted twice with a similar algorithm, it should
be over-encrypted.
The encryption sequence S and the selection map, which
states which slice is encoded, used by each encryptor have
to be known to the decoder or otherwise specified into a
information stream I1, itself encrypted into I2. The type
of algorithms has to be known or provided into a stream
I3 as well.
All data, whether encrypted or not, are then reassembled
into a format compliant stream. As far as merging is con-
cerned, the amounts of bits prior to and after encryption
are the same. Since encrypted slices are put in place of
the original data and the number of encrypted bits is low,
substitution is fast to accommodate to speed requirements
of real-time processing.
After merging, there follows 2 embedding steps.
1. The first step embeds all the information related to
the encryptors (algorithms, keys in the case of pub-
lic key cryptography, etc). Lossless data embedding
techniques are used; there are several techniques for
embedding regardless of the data formats but as a
general rule the bitstream size is increased. Subse-
quently the header might have to be adapted to take
changements into account.
2. The second step embeds the selection map and asso-
ciated data like used parameters. The technique used
for embedding is similar to the previous one.
Both embedding steps are complex and time consuming
because the format is altered at several places (it is not just
a substitution). However, if enough knowledge is avail-
able to the receiver, embedding can be skipped without
any further security weakness.
4. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we propose a generalized scheme to selec-
tively encrypt an image. The scheme offers several advan-
tages: flexibility, multiplicity, spatial selectively and for-
mat compliance. Secrecy results from a tradeoff between
processing power and speed, but real-time processing is
achievable.
(a) Original image (b) Encrypted by owner 1
(c) Encrypted by owner 1 and owner 2 (d) Locally encrypted image
Figure 2: Flexible multiple encryption and spatial selectivity.
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Figure 3: Self-sufficient selective encryption unit.
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